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Abstract
In the Berlioz judgement (C-482/15), dealing with the transnation-
al exchange of information on request, the CJEU extended the scope of article 51(1)
of CFR. The CJEU allows for judicial review of a penalty (article 47 CFR) also in
cases where such is necessary for the effective enforcement of the Directive on Admin-
istrative Cooperation 2011/16/EU. In reviewing a penalty, the domestic court can
and must also review the legality of the underlying order. The concerned party must
have access to the basic information about what and why something is requested from
him; it is therefore not necessary that he has full access to the actual competent
authority letter. The request must be foreseeable and relevant with respect to the tax-
ation of the subject, which the domestic court must ascertain. Based on the Union
principle of mutual trust it is not for the domestic court to review the stated facts and
circumstances. CFR precludes a restriction on access to a court. It needs to be seen
whether this judgement will have spill-over effects exceeding the transnational context
of the decision.
1. Introduction1
In the framework of the Directive on administrative coopera-
tion in the field of taxation (DAC),2 Berlioz Investment Fund S.A. was ordered
by her national competent authority to provide information that had been re-
quested by the competent authority in France. The Directive obliges Luxembourg
to assist France and to obtain the answer to questions, or to even to start an
investigation in order to obtain the requested information.
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Under national law of Luxembourg, Berlioz is obliged to comply with the
request and is not allowed to appeal a decision of a competent authority. Berlioz
was fined with a penalty of € 150 000 for not complying with the information
order. The referring Court (Administrative Court) requested a preliminary ruling
from the CJEU and wishes to know if Berlioz can rely on article 47 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR) to lodge an appeal against the penalty.
In this case note I will provide context and the background of the decision.
Mutual administrative assistance between national authorities in the field of
taxation is an important policy objective for the functioning of the internal
market. The internal market however, is also an area of Freedom, Security and
Justice (article 3 TEU) in which the basic rights of subjects are protected by
providing effective legal protection in fields covered by Union law (article 19
TEU). Therefore, the exercise of state authority must be balanced with respect
for the basic fundamental rights of subjects. After an introduction on the inter-
national and transnational principles of mutual administrative assistance with
respect to taxation,3 I will discuss the questions of the referring court and the
ruling of the CJEU on them. In the final section I will look at the relevance of
the decision for the international exchange of information. Before coming to
concluding remarks (5) I will share my remaining concerns with respect to the
influence of the decision on the bilateral exchange of information with States
outside the area of the EU.
1.1. Context and background
The exchange of information is the preferred method of mu-
tual assistance provided between Member States in the administration of na-
tional taxes. Where the tax administration of one State finds that relevant infor-
mation is detained on the territory of another State, that first State (the request-
ing State) can ask for assistance from other State (the requested or execution
State). The requested State then obtains the information from persons within
its territory and forwards the information to the requesting State. The condition
for the requested State to be able to provide that information, is often a legal
basis in the domestic law of the requested State that allows that State to pierce
the obligation of secrecy, in favour of administering taxes in another State. In
that respect there are three supranational instruments allowing for such lifting
of tax secrecy:
Excluding recovery of taxes.3
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a. The Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative
Cooperation in the field of taxation4 (hereinafter: DAC);
b. The bilateral agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the pre-
vention of tax evasion in relation to direct taxes on income and wealth;5
and
c. An international instrument, exclusively drafted with a view to mutual as-
sistance with respect to the levying and recovery of taxes, and often supple-
mentary to the bilateral treaty, is the joint effort of Council of Europe &
OECD that resulted in the 1988 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax
matters, as amended by 2010 Protocol.6
Almost all Member States of the EU concluded bilateral tax treaties with
each other on the basis of the OECD template. The OECD Model Tax Convention
(hereinafter: OECD-MTC) is a dynamic Model, adjusted regularly and accom-
panied by a commentary that serves as a guidance for interpreting the articles
of the Model Convention.7 Though the Model Convention is dynamic, this does
not imply that the bilateral agreements drafted and concluded on the basis of
the then available wording of the Model are also dynamic in their application.
Amendments to existing tax conventions find their way through additional
Protocol provisions and Memoranda of Understanding. This however leads to
a plurality of different treaty provisions between the Member States of the EU.
It was for this reason that the European Commission introduced the first Mu-
tual Assistance Directive in 1977 in order to harmonize the different provisions
for mutual assistance that existed between Member States.8 As is stated in the
preamble: ‘… collaboration between tax administrations within the Community
should therefore be strengthened in accordance with common principles and
rules’.9 The common principles and rules refer to the Commentary to article
26 of the OECD MTC, 1977 edition and further adjustments of that Comment-
ary. In the last twenty years the common principles and rules have evolved from
a best practice (‘should’) into an obligation (‘shall’) especially in regard to carry-
Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of
taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, OJ L 64, 11.3.2011, p. 1-12.
4
The Model Convention that provides a template for most bilateral treaties is the OECD-Model
tax convention (for tax conventions between OECD-Member States) and the UN-Model tax




For most recent (2014) version, see www.oecd.org/ctp/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-
on-capital-condensed-version-20745419.htm.
7
Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the
competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, OJ L 336, 27.12.1977,
p. 15-20.
8
Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the
competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, OJ L 336 , 27/12/1977
P. 0015–0020.
9
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ing out administrative measures in order to obtain requested information. The
political driver for that development is the formulation of the so-called Standard
for the Exchange of Information on request (hereinafter: EOIR) by the Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (here-
inafter: Global Forum).10 The Standard found its way in the OECD-MTC in
2005 and was formally endorsed by G20 and OECD members in April 2009.11
This soft-law Standard became hard-law by an inclusion of that Standard in the
2011 Directive and resulted in an obligation on the Member States to implement
the provisions of the Directive. Restrictions on the obligation of a Member State
to cooperate are limited. In contrast with the 1977 Directive, the 2011 Directive
now states explicitly that the Directive respects fundamental rights and observes
the principles which are recognised; in particular by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: CFR).12 An important element of
the mutual assistance procedure is the speed and efficiency of the exchange
procedure.13 The Directive provides for a six month period in case the requested
authority needs to undertake an investigation, but a two month-period in case
the information is already available (article 7). The adherence of national author-
ities that are Global Forum members and identified jurisdictions held to the
standard for EOIR are made subject to a peer-review procedure undertaken by
the Global Forum. The Global Forum then qualifies the reviewed jurisdictions
(after phase 2) as ‘complaint’, ‘largely compliant’, ‘partially compliant’ and ‘non-
compliant’.14
1.2. Relevant jurisdiction: Luxembourg
The requested jurisdiction in the case discussed is Luxem-
bourg. Luxembourg’s legal framework for the exchange of information is
The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, is a sub-
division of the OECD, but composed also of non-OECD member jurisdictions. See
10
www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/. The Global Forum is mandated with the peer-review process
of adherence to the global standard for EOIR as endorsed by the OECD.
See more on EIOR Standard: Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 4th edition by Reimer
and Rust (ed.), Kluwer Law International, 2015; Xavier Oberson, International Exchange of In-
11
formation in Tax Matters, Edward Elger, 2015; Danon/Gutmann/Oberson/Pistone (ed.), Modèle
de Convention fiscal OCDE concernant le revenu et la fortune, Commentaire, Helbing Lichtenhahn,
Editions Francis Lefebvre 2013; Vogel/Lehner (ed.), DBA Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Kom-
mentar, 6.Auflage, Verlag C.H. Beck, München 2015.
Preambule DAC, no. 28.12
Preamble 12 of DAC provides: ‘Time limits for the provision of information under this Directive
should be laid down in order to ensure that the information exchange is timely and thus effec-
tive’.
13
See further Leo E.C. Neve, ‘The Peer review Process of the Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, a critical assessment on authority and legitimacy’,
in: Erasmus Law Review, 2017, November, forthcoming.
14
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heavily influenced by the first15 and second phase peer-review report of the
Global Forum.16 The phase 2 report criticizes the legal framework and practice
of Luxembourg and attributes an overall qualification of ‘non-compliant’ to
Luxembourg.17 The Global Forum developed the so-called ‘Terms of Reference’
in order to be able to assess adherence to the Standard of EOIR by participants.
The Terms of Reference for assessing adherence to the EOIR Standard contain
three basic components, broken down into ten essential elements.18
Interesting for our analysis is element B 2, stating:
The rights and safeguards (e.g. notification, appeal rights) that apply to persons in
the requested jurisdiction should be compatible with effective exchange of information;
The rights and safeguards that apply to persons in the requested jurisdiction
should be balanced with the effectiveness of the exchange procedure. The
Global Forum in its peer reviews has criticized several countries, including The
Netherlands and Luxembourg, for obstructing the efficiency of the process due
to administrative and judicial review of the decisions to exchange information.19
The Global Forum was, in relation to the Netherlands, especially critical on the
administrative procedures such as the notifying of the intention to exchange
information, the possibility of reviewing exchange decisions, the length of court
proceedings and the right to be heard relating to the disclosure of documents.20
In the process of moving towards positive compliance ratings, jurisdictions
such as Luxembourg and The Netherlands adjusted their legislative framework,
abolished the notification procedure and restricted judicial review. As a con-
sequence, concerned persons (specifically the information owner and the subject
of the investigation) have lost valuable legal protection, which are the rights to
oppose providing the information.21
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews:
Luxembourg 2011 PHASE 1 August 2011 (reflecting the legal and regulatory framework as at
May 2011).
15
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews:
Luxembourg 2013 PHASE 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARD IN PRACTICE No-
vember 2013 (reflecting the legal and regulatory framework as at May 2013), OECD, Paris.
16
See phase 2 Report Luxembourg, para. 14: ‘In view of the ratings for each of the essential ele-
ments taken in their entirety, the overall rating for Luxembourg is Non-Compliant’.
17
Terms of Reference to Monitor and Review Progress towards Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes, OECD, CTPA 2010.
18
Luxembourg has only a judicial appeals procedure and no administrative review procedure.19
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of information for tax purposes, Peer Review
Report Combined: Phase 1+ Phase 2, incorporating Phase 2 ratings, The Netherlands, 2013,
OECD, Paris, para. 306.
20
In general the taxpayer is obliged to provide information. Also third parties who possess relevant
information can be forced to provide information on taxable subjects.
21
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Countries that have adjusted their national administrative procedures include
the Netherlands, which introduced a bill on 25 September 2013 to amend the
International Assistance (Levying of Taxes) Act.22 This bill proposed abolishing
the notification procedure with the intention to restrict the opportunity for ju-
dicial review by a court. In his explanatory note to the proposed amendment,
the State Secretary of Finance argued that the peer review report recommended
abolishing this notification procedure and also that the new EU Directive on
Administrative Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as: DAC 1)23 did not recog-
nize this procedure.24 The amendment also implied that the person would no
longer be able to ask for an ex-ante judicial review against the decision to provide
the requested information.25 Since 1 January 2014, therefore, the possibility of
a judicial review is no longer available in The Netherlands.26
Just over a year later, on 25 November 2014, Luxembourg introduced legis-
lation to amend its Act of 31 March 2010.27 Under Article 6(1) of the amended
legislation, a very limited remedy is available against a request for the exchange
of information or against a decision ordering the production of information.28
The only available remedy is against the penalty imposed for not complying
with the order.29 The Luxembourg government, too, argued that the Global
Transparency Forum required Luxembourg to make these changes.30
In the Cahier de droit fiscal international vol.100B on The practical protection
of taxpayers’ fundamental rights of 2015, the International Fiscal Association
(IFA)31 also identified Austria, Liechtenstein, Portugal and Switzerland as juris-
dictions under pressure from the Global Transparency Forum to remove their
existing procedures for notifying taxpayers and their ability to challenge cross-
Wet Internationale bijstand bij de heffing van belastingen.22
Directive 2011/16/EU.23
Parliamentary Papers II 2013/14, 33753, 3, p. 10-11.24
Parliamentary Papers II 2013/14, 33753, 3, p. 34-35.25
That statement was repeated during the parliamentary process of approving the bill on the
implementation of the automatic exchange of tax rulings, Parliamentary Papers I 2016/17,
34527, B, p. 2.
26
Mémorial, Recueil de législation, appli.no. 214/27, 27 November 2014, p. 4170.27
The single ground for review is the irregularity of the request: art 7 (1) «… Le recours ne peut
porter que sur la régularité formelle de la décision d’injonction émise par l’administration
fiscale compétente ….».
28
This issue is now decided in CJEU 16-5-2017, Berlioz Investment Fund S.A., C-682/15,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:373, where the Cour d’appel has requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.
See also final decision Cour d’appel Luxembourg of 26 October 2017, no. 36893Ca.
29
See Chambre députés, projet loi Doc. parl. 6680; sess. extra ord. 2013-2014 et sess. ord. 2014-
2015 and Peer review report on Luxembourg, phase 2, para. 407 and 436.
30
For the IFA, see www.ifa.nl/Pages/default.aspx. The IFA is a non-governmental and non-sec-
toral international organization that offers a forum for experts from different sectors of society
31
to exchange opinions on topics of international taxation with regard for each other's background
and responsibilities.
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border exchange of information (‘EOI’).32 With this context as background, we
can now look at the decision of the CJEU in Berlioz.
2. Judgement
2.1. Facts and legal frame of the case
Berlioz Investment Fund SA, a corporation formed under the
law of Luxembourg, is a shareholder of its French subsidiary Cofima SA. The
subsidiary is able to declare dividends without having to withhold tax under the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive 90/435/EEC and its successor Directive
2011/96/EU33 (position taken by Cofima SA), but needs to respect certain con-
ditions (position taken by French authorities)34 with respect to the identity of
its direct (and indirect) shareholders. Berlioz refers to the Denkavit-decision35
where the CJEU has decided that parent companies in member states must be
treated equally as domestic parent companies.36 After the Denkavit decision of
the CJEU, France has introduced anti-avoidance measures in its domestic leg-
islation.37 The French competent authority has requested the Luxembourg
competent authority to instruct Berlioz to provide the names of their sharehold-
ers and the equity-interest each shareholder holds in the company. Berlioz In-
vestment Fund SA refuses to provide the answers to these questions, because
it deems the reply not relevant for the tax position in France of Cofima SA,
claiming to be itself a Luxembourg entity entitled to withholding tax relief, irre-
spective of the fiscal residence of its shareholders. Berlioz receives an injunction
under the law of Luxembourg to provide the information and is subsequently
fined for € 250 000 because of a refusal to cooperate. Upon judicial review in
the administrative court the fine was subsequently reduced to € 150 000.
See Baker/Pistone, General Report IFA 2015, ‘The Practical Protection of Taxpayers’ Fundamental
Rights’, p. 51.
32
Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable
in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, OJ L 225,
33
20.8.1990, and Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system
of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member
States, OJ L 345, 29.12.2011, p. 8-16.
The option offered by Article 1(2) of Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990.34
Decision CJEU 14 December 2006, case 170/05 (Denkavit France), ECLI:EU:C:2006:783, para.
39.
35
Note that de Denkavit France decision was issued before the coming into force of the Parent-
Subsidiary directive 1990. This directive allows anti-tax avoidance measures. Those measures
are the subject of the Eqiom-case C-6/16, CJEU 7-9-2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:641.
36
These anti-avoidance measures in the Parent-Subsidiary directive have been contested and
CJEU has ruled in decision 7-9-2017 C-6/16 (Eqiom) that the shifting of the burden of proof to
the beneficiary is precluded under EU law.
37
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2.2. Preliminary procedure
In appeal of the lower court’s decision, the administrative
court refers the case to the CJEU posing six preliminary questions. The questions
relate to issues of
1. The scope of Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union as
given in article 51(1) (‘provisions of this Charter are addressed to … the Member
States only when they are implementing Union law’);
2. Application of article 47 Charter fundamental rights (Right to an effective
remedy and to a fair trial);
3. Intensity of judicial review.
These preliminary questions to the CJEU are very important for the judicial
protection of the information holder in tax information exchange procedures.
The questions have been decided by the Grand Chamber.
2.2.1. Application of article 51(1) CFR
The first question relates to the application of the CFR. The
preamble to the DAC states in rec. 28:
This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles which are
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.
Even with the specific reference to the CFR, the opposing Member States
France and Luxembourg are of the opinion that due to the fact that the penalty
is not foreseen in the Directive, the national law imposing the fine cannot be
seen as the implementation of Union law, a basic requirement of article 51 CFR
for the application of the Charter to the Member States.38 The CJEU clearly
denies this argument (para. 37-39):
37. While it refers to the measures aimed at gathering information that exist under
national law, Directive 2011/16 thus requires Member States to take the necessary
measures to obtain the requested information in a way that is consistent with
their obligations in relation to the exchange of information.
38. It must be noted that, in order to ensure that the directive has practical effect,
those measures must include arrangements, such as the pecuniary penalty at
issue in the main proceedings, which ensure that there is sufficient incentive for
the relevant person to respond to tax authorities’ requests, and thereby enable
This seems to be a quiet reference to C-418/11 (Texdata Software), ECLI:EU:C:2013:588.38
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the requested authority to fulfil its obligations towards the requesting authority.
39. The fact that Directive 2011/16 does not make express provision for penalties to
be imposed does not mean that penalties cannot be regarded as involving the
implementation of that directive and, consequently, falling within the scope of
EU law.
The Court refers to the fact that the DAC imposes certain obligations on
Member States, more in particular to take ‘measures aimed at gathering infor-
mation’ (article 18 DAC) and the ‘necessary measures to ensure smooth operation
of the administrative cooperation agreements’ (article 22(1) DAC). Therefore
the pecuniary penalties imposed by the Luxembourg authorities are ‘within the
scope of Union law’.39 The CJEU and the A-G Wathelet hereby refer to the de-
cision in Åkerberg Fransson where CJEU declared:
It follows that tax penalties and criminal proceedings for tax evasion, such as those
to which the defendant in the main proceedings has been or is subject because the
information concerning VAT that was provided was false, constitute implementation
of Articles 2, 250(1) and 273 of Directive 2006/112 (previously Articles 2 and 22 of
the Sixth Directive) and of Article 325 TFEU and, therefore, of European Union law,
for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter.40
2.2.2. Judicial review
The second issue before the CJEU relates to judicial review
of the underlying order that initiated the fine. Berlioz questions the legality of
the underlying order that required her to produce the requested information.
She is of the opinion that some of the questions posed have no connection with
the levying of taxes. But is she in this respect entitled to an effective remedy on
the ground of Article 47 CFR? do some conditions have to be fulfilled before
Article 47 is applicable, or is it applicable irrespective of which rights and
freedoms are at stake? The point here is that the DAC does not confer any rights
on individuals. It is derived from the earlier case Sabou41 that the Directive
covers only the exchange of information between competent authorities and
confers only rights and obligations on the Member States. The Directive does
not oblige Member States to give the taxpayer a hearing. (Sabou, para. 30 to 36).
In the opinion of the CJEU that do s not mean, however, that an individual has
Judgement, para. 39.39
Decision CJEU 26-2-2013, C-617/10 (Åkerberg Fransson), ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para. 27.40
Decision CJEU 22-10-2013, C-276/12 (Sabou), ECLI:EU:C:2013:678.41
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no right to defend his position before a tribunal in accordance with article 47
of CFR (para.49):
fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the EU are applicable in all
situations governed by EU law and the applicability of EU law entails applicability
of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.
The Court refers to earlier judgements when he makes the statement that
it should be born in mind that (rec. 51):
protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention by public authorities in
the sphere of the private activities of any natural or legal person constitutes a general
principle of EU law.
The protection may be invoked by a relevant person in respect of a measure
adversely affecting him, such as the information order and the penalty at issue
and that person can rely on a right guaranteed by EU law, within the meaning
of article 47 of the Charter, giving him the right to an effective remedy (para.
52). With respect to the subject matter of the right, the Court makes a distinction
between a remedy against the penalty or a challenge of the information order
on which the penalty is based and decides that in order to satisfy the requirement
of Article 47 CFR, the national court must be able to examine the legality of
that information order as well.
2.2.3. Foreseeably relevant
The third issue, which is the subject of the fourth question of
the referring court, is whether it is a condition that the question of the requesting
State is of ‘foreseeable relevance’ for the assessment of the subject. The referring
court in fact wishes to know if the information request must be given ‘recogni-
tion’ without scrutiny of the relevant legal basis.42 This issue questions the le-
gality of the information order addressed by a Member State to a relevant person.
The CJEU opines that the words ‘foreseeably relevant’ describe a necessary
characteristic of the requested information, rec. 63:
It is apparent from the wording of those provisions that the words ‘foreseeably relevant’
describe a necessary characteristic of the requested information. The obligation imposed
on the requested authority under Article 5 of Directive 2011/16 to cooperate with the
In the Referenzentscheidungsmodell of Sydow the requested State must recognize the legitimacy
of the request under its national law. Gernot Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation in der Europäischen
Union, Mohr Siebeck 2004, par. 9 on Referenzentscheidungsmodell.
42
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requesting authority does not extend to the communication of information that is
considered not to have that characteristic.
The obligation to cooperate with the requesting authority is limited to infor-
mation that is considered to have relevance. That relevance must be foreseeable.
The information should be able to clear a certain relationship or a certain fact
that may be potentially relevant. The national court does not have to investigate
whether the question is relevant, because that requires an in-depth analysis of
the facts, for which the court is not equipped and which would cost a lot of time.
Given the urgency of any reply to a request, the national court only has to con-
sider if the questions may be relevant for the requesting authority.
2.2.4. Intensity of judicial review
The issue of the legality of the request is addressed in the third
and fifth questions of the referring court. Having seen that the ‘foreseeable
relevance’ of the question is a condition that must be fulfilled, the third and
fifth questions relate to the intensity of the judicial review of that condition.
The CJEU decided that, in the context of the review of the penalty, the national
court has unlimited jurisdiction to review the legality of the information order
(para. 82). That review is not limited to the procedural regularity of the request,
but the national court must verify that the condition of foreseeable relevance
has been satisfied in all its aspects, including the limitations of article 17 DAC.
The scope of the review is however limited, because the cooperation between
tax authorities is based on rules intended to create confidence between Member
States. The requested authority must trust the requesting authority. It must
assume that the request for information complies with the requirements of the
domestic law of the requesting authority and that the request is necessary for
the purposes of its investigation.43 The review of the request by the requested
authority is limited to the discretion exercised by the requesting authority. The
review by the court is therefore limited to a verification whether the information
sought is not devoid of any foreseeable relevance to the investigation, para. 86:
Consequently, the courts must merely verify that the information order is based on a
sufficiently reasoned request by the requesting authority concerning information that
is not – manifestly – devoid of any foreseeable relevance having regard, on the one
hand, to the taxpayer concerned and to any third party who is being asked to provide
the information and, on the other hand, to the tax purpose being pursued.
Judgement, para. 77.43
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It is therefore the task of the requested authority to verify, not only the pro-
cedural regularity, but in principle (para. 89):
to satisfy itself that the information sought is not devoid of any foreseeable relevance
having regard to the identity of the taxpayer concerned and that of any third party
asked to provide the information, and to the requirements of the tax investigation
concerned.
The national court has thus jurisdiction to vary the penalty imposed and to
review the legality of that information order. In that respect (rec. 89):
the courts review is limited to verification that the requested information manifestly
has no such relevance.
2.2.5. Competent Authority Letter
The final issue, the sixth question, is about the content of the
case file. The question here is whether, in the context of judicial review, the
court of the requested Member State must have access to the request for infor-
mation (the Competent Authority Letter, hereinafter CAL) and the additional
question is whether that document must also be communicated to the concerned
person in that State or whether access to that document may be refused on
grounds of confidentiality. Basically the requested State must keep the commu-
nication confidential with the requesting State. Article 16 DAC provides therefore
that the communication shall be covered by the obligation of official secrecy
and will enjoy the protection equivalent to similar information under the na-
tional law of the Member State which received it. National treatment is thereby
the norm. National treatment can differ between the Member States. The DAC
does not prescribe a certain attitude.
The law in Luxembourg provides that the requested person must know what
is requested from him (and not the reason why). That law does not specify that
a reason must be given, nor that the foreseeable relevance of the questions must
be disclosed.
In that respect the CJEU finds that the information order did not provide
sufficient information in order to establish the foreseeable relevance of the
questions. Therefore, the complete CAL mus be brought to the tribunal hearing
the case against the pecuniary penalty, as otherwise it would be unable to carry
out the review of legality required by Article 47 of the Charter. The CJEU
(para. 101):
Consequently, the answer to the sixth question is that the second paragraph of Arti-
cle 47 of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a judicial
review by a court of the requested Member State, that court must have access to the
request for information addressed to the requested Member State by the requesting
Review of European Administrative Law 2017-2106
NEVE
IP: 145.5.87.236 On: Thu, 04 Oct 2018 09:37:45
Copyright Paris Legal Publishers
Delivered by Ingenta
Member State. The relevant person does not, however, have a right of access to the
whole of that request for information, which is to remain a secret document in accor-
dance with Article 16 of Directive 2011/16. In order for that person to be given a full
hearing of his case in relation to the lack of any foreseeable relevance of the requested
information, it is sufficient, in principle, that he be in possession of the information
referred to in Article 20(2) of that directive.
2.3. Conclusions Berlioz
A penalty imposed to give effect to an obligation based on (but
not written into) a Directive is an act within the scope of Union law and implies
that the CFR is applicable. The national court has unlimited jurisdiction to re-
view the legality of the information order and can vary the penalty. The foresee-
ably relevance of the request is an anchoring principle. The scope of the review
of the foreseeably relevance of the request is limited, given the time constraints
of the inquiry, also with regard to principle of confidence and the fact that in-
formation which has no relevance cannot be used against the taxpayer. The
Competent Authority Letter need not to be disclosed, if the concerned party is
otherwise informed of the information that is requested and the purpose for
which it is requested. The referring court has jurisdiction to review the legality
of the request. In his final decision the Cour d’Appel, taking into account the
ruling of the CJEU, concluded that the competent authority has not reviewed
the foreseeably relevance of the request and cancelled the injunction.44
3. Relevance of the decision
Berlioz is an important decision for the exchange of informa-
tion under principles of European administrative law. The European Union is,
because of the interconnection between the European and national legal orders,
referred to as an ‘integrated or composite’ legal order. Because national law is
employed to implement Union law the European administration is often referred
to as a ‘shared administration’.45 In this shared administration, the cooperation
between Member States (horizontal) and between Commission and Member
States (vertical) is based on the principle of sincere cooperation, article 4(3)
TEU. And in this shared administration, the citizens of the EU have rights and
Member States have the obligation (article 19 TEU) to provide remedies sufficient
to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law. Under
Final decision Cour d’appel Luxembourg of 26 October 2017, no. 36893Ca.44
See further J.H. Jans, S.Prechal and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law,
2nd ed. European Law Publishing, Groningen 2015, p. 7 with further references.
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the pressure of the Global Forum the Member State Luxembourg had cancelled
the protection of citizens against exchange of information with another Member
State, which is against the treaty (constitutional) right to an effective remedy.
The global norm of EOIR is confronted with the normative framework of the
EU legal order. Citizens’ rights prevail.
3.1. International and transnational mutual assistance
The transnational obligation of Member States to provide each
other mutual assistance in the levying of taxes is based on the Directive (DAC).
The directive provides for coordination at administrative level due to the obliga-
tion of a Member State to respond to a request. However, there is also a strict
separation between the jurisdictions of the national courts, meaning that co-
operation between national authorities on the basis of the Directive is adjudicated
in the jurisdiction that takes the final decision. Irregularities in the process of
an information request in the requested (executing) State cannot be adjudicated
by a court in the requesting State that takes the final decision. The question
then is whether a concerned party in the executing State (often the information
holder) has standing in his State against the order to produce the information.
This question is relevant because the request for information is of a preparatory
nature for decisions that will be taken in the requesting State in relation to the
taxable subject (as was the case in Sabou46). Berlioz deals only with the rights
and remedies available to the concerned party in the requested state. The refer-
ring Court asks itself whether the information request is (in the terminology
of EU administrative law) in fact an authorisation with automatic transnational
effect or whether that effect is subject to verification by the national authority
(leading to potential instability of the transnational act).47 If the act is self-ex-
ecuting, the host country is prohibited from carrying out any verification of the
validity of the act itself.48 The decision paradigm is different in case the host
country must undertake a verification as to the legitimacy, which can result in
a recognition or a refusal and thereby lead to a potential instability of the
transnational effect. The latter will however give more weight to the interests
of the host country.
Decision CJEU 22-10-2013, C-276/12 (Sabou), ECLI:EU:C:2013:678.46
See Gernot Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation in der Europäischen Union, Mohr Siebeck 2004,
par. 9 on Referenzentscheidungsmodell.
47
See opinion A-G Bobek in C-298/16 (Ispas) where the A-G questions the self-executing character
of an E 101-declaration in case of fraud.
48
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3.2. Article 19 TEU
Article 19 of the TEU instructs Member States to ensure effec-
tive legal protection in a field covered by Union law. The case of Berlioz is an
illustrative example of the application of that rule. The constitutional nature of
article 19 TEU may conflict with the principle of procedural autonomy in
Member States.49 In the legal architecture of the EU, judicial enforcement of
EU law belongs firstly and mainly to national courts. And EU law is implemented
and enforced mainly through national administrative institutions and decisions,
which are subject to the jurisdiction of national courts. Therefore, EU law has
put constraints on national adjudication to ensure that the primacy of EU law
is secured. National courts are also the first in line for the execution of rights
given to subjects under the European Convention for the protection of Human
Rights (ECHR). Therefore, great importance is given to the possibility for sub-
jects to claim judicial protection and to present their case before an impartial
and independent tribunal. Article 6 of the ECHR and article 47 of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights (CFR) provide for the right of subjects to address a court
to claim effective legal protection in case protected rights have been infringed.
3.3. The scope of Article 51(1) CFR
The provisions of the CFR are addressed to Member States
‘only when they are implementing Union law’. The provision is designed to
clarify that under the CFR the Member States are only bound to respect funda-
mental rights in a cases governed by Union law.50 The leading case on the
meaning of the phrase ‘Member States only when they are implementing Union
law’ is the judgement of the CJEU of 26 February 2013 in Case C-617/10 (Åk-
lagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson). The case concerned the question whether
article 51 was satisfied so as to entitle an accused to invoke the ne bis in idem
principle, as protected by article 50 of the CFR. Criminal proceedings were in-
stigated against Mr Åkerberg for a breach of Swedish VAT law, while infractions
had already been dealt with by Swedish administrative authorities. A series of
Member States and the EU Commission questioned the admissibility of the
order for a reference. The Court considered that the situation was ‘governed by
European Union law’ because the tax penalties and criminal proceedings Mr.
Åkerberg was subjected to are ‘connected in part’ to breaches of his obligation
to pay VAT. The Court took article 235 TFEU into consideration and considered
that VAT fraud affects the financial interests of the European Union; thus tax
See J-B Auby, About Europeanization of Domestic Judicial Review, REALaw; Vol. 7, issue 2,
19-34 [2014].
49
Article 6(2) TEU and Text of Explanatory Note on article 51.50
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penalties and criminal prosecution to counter illegal activities affecting European
Union interests, constitute implementation of Union law and are within the
scope of article 51(1) CFR. Also in COM v. Greece51 and Bonda52 the protection
of EU interests were at stake. In Texdata Software53 the Directive left it to the
Member States to determine the appropriate penalties in order to ensure com-
pliance with disclosure obligations. In Berlioz there is no reference in the Direc-
tive to an effective enforcement of obligations for the concerned persons. The
scope of Union law here is directly related to the obligation of the Member State
to ensure that the Directive has practical effect, so that the implementation
must include arrangements which ensure that there is sufficient incentive for
the relevant person to respond to the authorities’ requests. The scope of article
51(1) CFR however is not finally settled. A-G Bobek in his conclusion in case
Ispas54 made a distinction between three scenarios for the application of article
51(1) CFR. The first scenario concerns the direct application of Union law, which
poses no special problems. In the second scenario, the indirect application is
of more concern. The third scenario, the derogation scenario, is where national
law derogates from Union law. In the indirect application scenario national and
European rules apply. The pertinent issue identified by the A-G Bobek is the
proximity between the original EU law obligation and its national (non-)realisa-
tion or, put differently, the degree of specificity of the EU law rule or obligation
at issue.55 What is exactly meant by implementing EU law obligations? The re-
sponse is not so difficult with respect to substantive provisions of EU law, but
more complicated when it comes to procedural elements. The applicability of
EU fundamental rights requires a solid degree of connection.56 It should be
noted here that the original law of 2010 was meant to implement the transpar-
ency Standard to which Luxembourg had committed itself in March 2009, es-
pecially with respect to banking information. The amendments of 2014 were
also aimed at the implementation of the Directive 2011/16. Thus, there was a
specific connection between the national procedural rules and the DAC.
With the CFR being applicable, this opens the door to the application of ar-
ticle 47, the basic article providing for a right to an effective remedy, being a
general principle of EU law. This right is an essential requirement for ensuring
the rule of law within the Union (art 2 TEU) as recognized in Les Verts57 and
further outlined in Union de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council.58 But note that as
Decision CJEU 21-9-1989, C-68/88 (COM v. Greece), ECLI:EU:C:1989:339.51
Decision CJEU, Grand Chamber, 5-6-2012, C-489/10 (Bonda), ECLI:EU:C:2012:319.52
Decision CJEU 26-9-2013, C-418/11 (Texdata Software), ECLI:EU:C:2013:588.53
Opinion A-G Bobek 7-9-2017, C-298/16 (Ispas), ECLI:EU:C:2017:650.54
Opinion A-G Bobek, rec. 33.55
See also decision CJEU 6-3-2014, C-206/13 (Siragusa), ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, para. 24.56
Decision CJEU 23-4-1986, C-294/83 (Les Verts), ECLI:EU:C:1986:166.57
Decision CJEU 25-7-2002, C-50/00 (Union de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council),58
ECLI:EU:C:2002:462.
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a general principle, the right to an effective remedy is not only depending upon
article 51 CFR. In Sabou59 the CJEU recognized that the CFR was not yet appli-
cable, but that the Court still has jurisdiction to decide the case. Para. 28:
It is clear from the case-law of the Court that the rights of the defence, which include
the right to be heard, are among the fundamental rights that form an integral part
of the European Union legal order. Where national legislation comes within the scope
of European Union law, the Court, when requested to give a preliminary ruling, must
provide all the criteria of interpretation required by the national court to determine
whether that legislation is compatible with fundamental rights.(references to decided
case law omitted).
It should be mentioned here that the right to an effective judicial remedy is
an accessory right, in that it requires another right arising from EU law to be
protected before it will become operative. That right can be a protection from
a penalty or fine, but also a right to be protected from interference with private
and family life, home and correspondence and a right to data protection. Pro-
tection against interference with private life is under circumstances applicable
to legal entities, but a right to data protection is restricted to natural persons.
Exchange of information cases often refer to an exchange of data about private
persons and this data is therefore often protected against interference by a for-
eign authority. The CJEU has confirmed that a decision to exchange information
is a decision adversely affecting the interests of a person, whether that person
is the subject of the investigation or an otherwise concerned party.60 That person
has the right to be heard and to express his views. And ultimately that person
has a right of judicial review, whether the national law of that party provides
for a review process or not. Member States are thus under an obligation to
create remedies additional to those already existing under their national proce-
dural law, if it is necessary to guarantee the relation between rights and remedies
under EU law. A Fine example of that is the cases of Borelli61 and Factortame.62
The direct effect of Union law requires that conflicting national rules are to be
set aside and therefore the limitation of access to court in the Luxembourg law
is set aside in Berlioz.
Decision CJEU 22-10-2013, C-276/12 (Sabou), ECLI:EU:C:2013:678.59
Sabou, C-276/12, para. 38 and decision CJEU 18-12-2008, C-349/07 (Sopropé),
ECLI:EU:C:2008:746, para. 37.
60
Decision CJEU 3-12-1992, C-97/91 (Oleificio Borelli/Commission), ECLI:EU:C:1992:491.61
Decision CJEU 5-3-1996, C-48/93 (Factortame), ECLI:EU:C:1996:79.62
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3.4. Effective remedy Article 47 CFR
The ruling of the CJEU in Berlioz, requiring ‘recognition’ in
national law of a foreign act, is understandable because the transnational effect
of the information request (the obligation to cooperate) is not automatically
provided. The act of ‘recognition’ requires the national authority to verify if the
conditions for execution are fulfilled. The principle of proportionality requires
a balancing of interests, which review is the task of the national competent
authority and ultimately of the domestic court.
It is necessary here to make a firm distinction between the taxpayer who is
the subject of the investigation and the concerned party who is asked to the
provide information. For the taxpayer the investigation is preparatory to the final
decision on the assessment. He cannot challenge a preparatory measure. But
a concerned person who is asked to provide information in the context of an
exchange of information between national tax administrations pursuant to DAC
is entitled to challenge the legality of that decision (Berlioz para. 59).
3.5. Scope of review
Up to 2005 the official text and Commentary to article 26 of
OECD MTC referred to information that was ‘necessary’ for carrying out the
provisions of the Convention and domestic laws. The first Mutual Assistance
Directive (77/799/EEC)(hereinafter:MAD) requested information to be ex-
changed that ‘may enable’ the competent authorities to effect a correct assess-
ment of taxes on income and on capital. This was already a deviation from the
OECD norm of ‘necessary information’. The 2011 Directive (replacing the MAD)
brings back the foreseeable relevance wording, replacing necessity. We will
need to observe here that the ECHR (article 8(2)) requests an infringement to
be in accordance with the law and ‘necessary’ in a democratic society, in order
to be acceptable, conditioned by proportionality and subsidiarity. This means
that the infringement in private life must have a basis in the law and not go
further than necessary, while respecting less intrusive measures. The limitation
of the burden to comply is based on proportionality (see article 17 DAC). A re-
quested State does not have to take measures that the requesting State itself
cannot fulfil (principle of reciprocity), the requesting State must have exhausted
its own national resources and means (subsidiarity) before moving to interna-
tional assistance and finally the questions must have foreseeable relevance. All
these limitations are case-sensitive.
3.5.1. Review of legality
There has been questioning in the comments on the Berlioz
judgement, whether the ruling of the CJEU is also relevant in case there has
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been an order to provide information, without a penalty.63 Nothing in the
wording of the ruling of the CJEU indicates that a penalty is a necessary requi-
site. In para. 99 the CJEU provides guidance also for review of the order without
there being a penalty. The CJEU puts the legality review of the information order
at the same level as the review of the legality of the penalty.
3.6. Competent Authority Letter
The OECD-Commentary to the article 26 OECD-MTC (para.
11) provides that the confidentiality rules apply also to the Competent Authority
Letter (CAL). And also that the requested state, in general, can disclose the
minimum information contained in the CAL, (but not the letter itself) that is
necessary for the requested state to obtain or provide the requested information
to the requesting state, without frustrating the efforts of the requesting State.
The OECD-Commentary adds that if court proceedings under the domestic
laws of the requested State necessitate the disclosure of the Competent
Authority Letter itself, the competent authority may disclose such a letter unless
the requesting State specifies otherwise.
The matter affects the adversarial principle. The link between the requested
information and the tax objective pursued by the requesting authority is de-
veloped in the CAL. The person concerned needs to know which information
is requested and for what purpose. The law in Luxembourg however provides
only that the requested person must know what information should be provided
by him and not the reason why. The law does not specify that a reason must be
given, nor that the foreseeable relevance of the questions must be disclosed.
The guarantee of an effective remedy requires as a minimum that the inde-
pendent appeals authority must be informed of the reasons grounding the
contested decision, even if such reasons are not publicly available. A-G Wathelet
refers in his conclusion to the conclusion of A-G Bot in case ZZ64 that the
tribunal must have access to all information even where an allegation of a threat
to national security is made (para.92). This implies a full disclosure to the tribunal,
but is restricted to the task of the tribunal. That task is to establish the foresee-
able relevance of the questions for the taxation interest of the requesting State.
Full disclosure of the CAL is therefore not necessary if that relevance can be
established from the information given by the requested authority. Whether
the CAL will be disclosed to the litigating party is subject to the discretion of
the tribunal in those cases where the d fendant objects to the disclosure. Even
if the DAC and the Commentary provide that the CAL will not be disclosed, a
sealing of that letter or otherwise limiting the access of the litigant to the letter
See J.A.R. van Eijsden, note in BNB 2017/178.63
CJEU, C-300/11 (ZZ), EU:C:2012:563.64
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is subject to a balancing of the interests at stake. The interest of the competent
authority in preserving the confidentiality of the communication with the
competent authority of the requesting State must be balanced with the interests
of the litigant in a full disclosure of the letter. The adversarial trial principle
requires an equality of arms. Only if the interests of State outweigh the interests
of the litigant considerably, can the disclosure be restricted.65 But the tribunal
hearing the case should always articulate the reasons that would support a
sealing of the communication. It will be an abuse of discretion if the tribunal
fails to weigh openly the interests that are involved. Therefore, in general, one
can say that there are only reasons for limiting party access to the correspon-
dence if the requesting State has expressed its desire to keep the correspondence
confidential. The competent authority of the requested State should then give
the tribunal reasons for his refusal to give the litigant access to the whole file.
The role of the court is, in most cases, at least to articulate any reasons that
would support a restriction or explain why it made the decision to restrict. The
explicit findings by the court, whereby the court takes in consideration the entire
case specific balance of the right of access against interests favouring non-dis-
closure, must be with a level of detail that will allow for a review by appeal. The
result is often the statement that ‘there is a substantial probability that the investi-
gation will be compromised if the Letter is disclosed’. The Dutch Raad van State,
appeals court for administrative law, in general allows the sealing of the CAL
with the statement ‘in the interest of the relations of the Netherlands with other
States and given the economic and financial interests of the Netherlands’.66 The
CJEU in Berlioz has now made clear that the full request (CAL) should be
provided to the adjudicating court, contrary to the OECD commentary.
3.7. Notification requirement
The notification requirement is in my opinion a necessary
element of procedural justice in the legal protection of the taxpayer and of the
concerned party. The notification is an essential element of good governance
as it allows the concerned person to present his interests especially with respect
to the proportionality aspect of the necessity test. The legal requirement of
balancing interests of State and concerned persons require a standing of that
person in the process of adjudication and judicialisation. The European Court
of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) in his decision M.N. and Others v. San
Marino67stressed the importance of adequate guarantees against arbitrariness,
ECtHR judgement 16-2-2000, 28901/95 (Rowe and Davies), para. 61: ‘However, only such
measures restricting the rights of the defence which are strictly necessary are permissible under
Article 6 § 1’.
65
RVS 31-8-2009 (Othymia), ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BM7770.66
ECtHR 7-7-2015, Case of M.N. and others v. San Marino, appli.no. 28005/12, para. 73.67
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including the possibility of effective control of the measure (spontaneous ex-
change of information for tax purposes) at issue.
4. Two remaining concerns
I have two concerns with respect to the judgement. The first
one is the plurality of national treatment over a more uniform treatment. My
second concern relates to the emphasis on mutual trust in dealings between
Member States.
4.1. No uniform national treatment
The decision in Berlioz relates to the exchange of information
between Member States of the EU on the basis of DAC. The CJEU applies the
CFR as the basis of his decision and Member States should do the same. In
another case, the Tribunal administrative of Luxembourg was asked in 2015 to
decide on the exchange of information between Luxembourg and Argentina
(requesting State).68 The tribunal stayed the procedure, requesting the parties
to the litigation for comments on the preliminary ruling request of the admin-
istrative court in the case of Berlioz.69No decision in that case has yet been
published. It means that a concerned person can claim protection under the
CFR in case the legal basis of the information request is in the Directive. If the
legal basis is in a bilateral treaty, there will not be an EU-influence of the defence
rights of the concerned person. For states that are members of the Council of
Europe,70 the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and
fundamental freedoms (ECHR) is applicable.71 Article 6 of that Convention is
the gateway to judicial protection. But the application of article 6 is restricted
to ‘the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him’. A fine for not complying with a request for information is a penalty
with a punitive character and thus of criminal nature.72 Tax litigation, on sub-
stantive tax law, is excluded from the application of article 6 ECHR. However,
in the case of Sabou, the CJEU did not need the assistance of the CFR to con-
clude that Sabou had standing, as it was based on ‘general principles’ of
European law. The CJEU concluded (38):
Tribunal administratif 18-12-2015, no. 36985, not yet decided.68
At the time of writing this case-note the referenced case was still pending.69
www.coe.int. The Council of Europe is the continent's leading human rights organisation. It
includes 47 member states, 28 of which are members of the European Union.
70
ETS no. 5 Rome 4.XI.1950.71
ECtHR decision 24-2-1994, 12547/86 (Bendenoum v. France), para. 47.72
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The Court has previously ruled that observance of the rights of the defence is a general
principle of European Union law which applies where the authorities are minded to
adopt a measure which will adversely affect an individual (see Sopropé, paragraph
36). In accordance with that principle, the addressees of decisions which significantly
affect their interests must therefore be placed in a position in which they can effectively
make known their views as regards the information on which the authorities intend
to base their decision (see, inter alia, C-32/95 P Commission v. Lisrestal and Others
[1996] ECR I-5373, paragraph 21, and Sopropé, paragraph 37). The authorities of
the Member States are subject to that obligation when they take decisions which come
within the scope of European Union law, even though the European Union legislation
applicable does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (see Sopropé,
paragraph 38, and Case C-383/13 PPU G and R [2013] ECR, paragraph 35).
The question is therefore whether general principles of law can be found
in other jurisdictions as well. It is clear that any legal protection against infor-
mation exchange based on a bilateral treaty between Luxembourg and Argentina
cannot be based on European principles. But can a resident of Luxembourg, as
a concerned person involved in this procedure, claim in Luxembourg a general
principle that allows him to access the court to protect his interests? This
question brings us to the heart of the conflict between private interests and
state authority. Irrespective of positive words in a statute requiring a hearing
or access to a court, the scope of the judicial element in natural justice takes
precedence. In the process of balancing the interests of State and individual
one must recognize process rights in the adjudication procedure. Procedural
justice may lead to substantial justice of the outcome and thereby increase the
legitimacy of State’s action. Procedural rules also help to attain accurate decisions
on the substance of the case. Procedural rules help protect human dignity.
Whether or not the involved person can claim constitutional protection
against an infringement by the authorities of his fundamental rights is a matter
that will be decided differently in the plurality of administrative protection in
the various countries. In our example of Luxembourg, there will be no legal
protection available with respect to an information request from Argentina,
because the information holder will have no recourse to the CFR. However he
could address the ECtHR, a situation similar to the decided case of Othymia
Investments BV.73 In Othymia the ECtHR said it is
prepared to accept that there has been interference with the applicant company’s
rights under Article 8 (see Société Colas Est and Others v. France, no. 37971/97,
§ 42, ECHR 2002-III, and Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, no.
24117/08, § 106, 14 March 2013). Such interference will constitute a violation of that
ECtHR decision 16-6-2015 (Othymia Investments BV), appli.no. 75292/10.73
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Article unless it is ‘in accordance with the law’, pursues one or more of the ‘legitimate
aims’ set out in the second paragraph, and is ‘necessary in a democratic society’.74
The legitimate aim that the ECtHR accepts in Othymia is the EU’s internal
market: ‘the economies of the European Union Member States forming a unified
whole’.75 With respect to the necessity condition, the ECtHR takes in consider-
ation the Sabou judgement of the CJEU and accepts in Othymia that the subject
has no rights in the investigation stage of the process, even if the ‘applicant is
not the ‘taxpayer’ and therefore not directly concerned by the Sabou judgment.76 This
part of the decision has been subject to severe criticism, because it leaves the
concerned party, information holder, without judicial protection in his home
State. The CJEU in Berlioz has corrected that by providing defence rights to the
concerned party. An element of the necessity test is also a review of the adher-
ence to the proportionality-principle. In deciding whether the infringement of
a basic right is justified, the person must be heard and be able to give his view.
This means that he ultimately must have access to a court to balance the interest
of Argentina (and Luxembourg) in the exchange of information against his in-
dividual interest not to have his personal information divulged to a foreign
authority.
In the circumstances of that case the taxable subject of the investigation
may have grounds in litigation in Argentina to oppose the use of the information
from Luxembourg. The multi-jurisdictional nature of the information exchange
may and often will, diminish the protection of individual rights and possibilities
for effective judicial review. A judge in Argentina will not be able to validate
the legality of the information received from Luxembourg. This therefore re-
quires procedural rules in the international instrument that is used as a basis
for the exchange. It may also require that the executing State does not treat the
decision to exchange information as a ‘preparatory act’ (as ECtHR did in Othymia)
with respect to the final decision on the assessment.77
These international instruments (Double Tax Conventions and Multilateral
Convention) often do not provide for an ex-ante review of the legality for infor-
mation exchange. The multilateral 1988 Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Tax matters, as amended by 2010 Protocol, does not provide for process rights




See Herwig C.H. Hofmann, ‘Decision making in EU Administrative Law-The problem of
composite procedures’, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 199, 222(2009), who proposes review in form of a
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In those circumstances, only national laws can lay down the relevant rules. The tax-
payer may challenge the information concerning him conveyed to the tax authorities
of the requesting Member State in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable
in the Member State in question.
The CJEU gives priority to the plurality of national administrative law over
a direction towards approximation of national rules under common European
umbrella. The ruling of the CJEU in Sabou violates the equivalent protection
treatment of concerned persons. It could make a big difference for the taxpayer
whether the information order has been tested in advance in the executing State
for legality or whether his home court has to make such a determination.
4.2. Mutual trust
The CJEU places, because the EU is an integrated administra-
tion, great emphasis on the duty of sincere cooperation between Member States
(at horizontal level) and between Member States and Commission (at vertical
level) and the mutual trust element derived therefrom. The mutual trust between
Member States restricts the intensity of the review of the national courts. The
national court must accept that a request is deemed to be foreseeably relevant
in case the reason of the request and the persons involved are stated in the re-
quest. The national court has no full jurisdiction and may not verify if the stated
facts are true, it must accept the statements with respect to taxes covered and
the reciprocity and exhaustion of national measures.79
The duty of sincere cooperation does not exist in the strict sense between
members of the Council of Europe (to which the ECHR applies) and between
tax convention partners from jurisdictions outside the European Union. Even
if it can be deemed that the members of the Council of Europe will all apply
the principles of the ECHR, such cannot be deemed to be the case between
other tax convention partners. Is the fact that a concerned person is restricted
in adhering a court, for review of a decision to exchange information, an element
that is incompatible with the duty of a Contracting State to interpret and apply
a bilateral treaty in a manner consistent with fundamental rights? What is exactly
meant with exceptional situations that hinder Member States in verifying
whether a Member State has actually observed fundamental rights?80 When is
See for cases decided by ECtHR on restricted jurisdiction of the court, decision 22-11-1995
(Bryan v. UK), appli.no. 19178/91, decision 18-1-2001 (Chapman v. UK), appli.no. 27238/95 and
decision 18-01-2001 (Jane Smith), appli.no. 25154/94.
79
CJEU, Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 on the draft agreement providing for the accession
of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, pt. 192.
80
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the presumption conclusive?81 In contrast with the opinion 2/13 of the CJEU,
the ECtHR concluded, on the basis of his Bosphorus judgement, that the pre-
sumption of adherence to fundamental rights is in principle a rebuttable pre-
sumption.82 For the principle to be rebuttable, it needs that adherence to fun-
damental rights is manifestly deficient.
5. Concluding remarks
With the decision in Berlioz the CJEU has strengthened the
legal protection of the concerned party in exchange of information procedures
on the basis of the Directive (DAC). The CJEU corrects in fact the limitations
established by the ECtHR in Othymia (request is of preparatory nature for the
final decision of the requesting State) and decides that the enforcement of obli-
gations under a Directive falls within the scope of article 51 CFR and is therefore
subject to scrutiny by the Court. The CJEU invalidates the amendments of its
laws (restriction of access to court) imposed on Luxembourg by the Global
Forum. It needs to be seen whether the ECtHR will also provide protection to
the concerned party in an exchange of information on the basis of a bilateral
tax convention. The presumption of mutual trust, which restricts the review of
the facts by a court in EU settings, does not exist outside the area of Freedom,
Security and Justice. That requires a more in-depth review by a court, of facts
and legality. Positive law is lacking and the Standard for EOIR does not provide
for legal protection of taxpayers in transnational or international exchange of
information procedures. General principles of law should replace positive law
deficiencies. European parties are reasonably protected in a transnational setting,
but serious doubts exist with respect to the rights of concerned parties outside
the European area.
See CJEU decision 21-12-2011 (Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10) (N.S. v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department), pt. 100 considered in ECtHR decision 16-5-2016 (Avontis), case 17502/07,
pt. 46.
81
See ECtHR decision 30-6-2005 (Bosphorus), case 45036/98: 156. If such equivalent protection
is considered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not
82
departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement
legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation. However, any such pre-
sumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the
protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In its judgement on Avotins v. Latvia
(23-5-2016, appli.no. 17502/07) the ECtHR revisited the Bosphorus-judgement.
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